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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ELIZABETH VICTORIA COOK, 
Defendant and .Appellant, 
v. Case No. 20150847-CA 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee. 
REPLYBRIEFOFAPPELLANT 
Cook hereby adopts the Statement of the Case and Facts from the Opening Brief of 
Appellant and the terms therein defined as though fully set forth herein. Cook hereby submits 
the following reply to the State of Utah's Brief of Appellee, (the "State's Brief'): 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FAILING 
TO PROPERLY FIND AND CONCLUDE THAT COOK 
MANUEVERED THE DIRECTION OF THE FOUR-
WHEELER IN ORDER TO BE IN "ACTUAL PHYSICAL 
CONTROL." 
'[A]ctual physical control' in its ordinary sense means 'existing' or 'present bodily 
restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation.' " (citations omitted)) State v. 
Vialpando, 2004 UT .A.pp 95, ,I 21, 89 P.3d 209. In light of the purpose of the actual physical 
control provision, however, we conclude that, a passenger who grabs the steering wheel of a 
moving car and alters the car's movement has assumed actual physical control for purposes 
of the DUI statutes. Stale v. Rivera, 207 .Ariz. 69, 74, 83 P.3d 69, 74 (2004); citing Atkinson v. 
State. 331 Md. 199, 627 A.2d 1019, 1027 (1993). "A person drives a vehicle when he or she 
intentionalfy cause it to move by exercising actual p'-!Jsical control over it. The person must cause the 
vehicle to move, but the movement may be slight.» (Italics added) In re F.H. 192 Cal.App.4th 
1465, 1470, 122 Cal.Rtt.3d 43, 46 (2011). Concerning the scope of "actual physical control," 
this Court concluded that "the detennination must be made through examining the 'totality 
of the circumstances.'»> State v. Vialpando, 2004 UT App 95, 4tf22, 89 P.3d 209 (2004); citing 
State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 404,483 P.2d 442,478 (1971). 
"Merely giving a driver directions does not amount to control over the vehicle equal to 
that the drive exercises." Benson v. Sorrell, 627 N.E.2d 866, 869. (Indiana Ct App. 1994). In 
Leuck v. GoefZJ the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that "a [passenger] had the right to give [a 
driver] directions and, to be sure, could well have had a duty to warn if and only if she know 
of an impending danger and the [driver] was unaware of its presence." Ibid. 151 Ind.App 
528, 541, 280 N.E.2d 847, 855 (Indiana Ct. App. 1972); citing Holmes v. Combs, 120 Ind. App. 
331,335, 90 N.E.2d 822,824 (1950). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that judges can "disregard or discredit the 
prosecution's evidence only when it is 'wholly lacking and incapable of creating a reasonable 
inference regarding a portion of the prosecution's claim."' State v. Jones, 2016 UT 4, ,I 14, 365 
P.3d 1212 (2016); citing State v. Vizyj,n, 2006 UT 29 ,I 24, 137 P.3d 787 (citations omitted). 
"When evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts 'review the 
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. State v. Ring, 2013 UT App 98, ,I2, 300 P.3d 1291 (2013); 
citing State v. Shumw'!Y, 2002 UT 124,115, 63 P.3d 94 (2002). 
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The legal concept in Utah that "actual physical control'' requires existing directing of 
influence, domination or regulation comports with other jurisdictions' holdings that a 
passenger only legally takes that control from a driver by first voluntarily taking personal 
physical action to show intent, and then altering of the vehicle's movement to show control, 
which are both elements of the underlying crime itself. Vialpando at ,I 21; Rivera, 207 Ariz. at 
74, 83 P.3d at 74; Atkinson_. 331 Md. 199, 627 A.2d at 1027; F.H. 192 Cal.App.4th at 1470, 
122 Cal.Rtt.3d at 46. No evidence was presented to show movement of the vehicle from its 
intended path-the control element-under examination of the totality of the 
circumstances. Vialpando at ,I22; Bugger at 4 78. 
In the instant matter, J.C. testified that she had been driving the four-wheeler not Cook. 
J.C. stated that she felt in control of the four-wheeler. R142. When asked if Cook helped her 
steer J.C. replied: "she did at first because I almost crashed into the thing ... " R136. The 
problem with the phrase "at first" was that no time frame was established for precisely when 
this occurred during the course of the family outing. The State elicited no testimony from 
J.C. to clarify if she was referring to when they very "first" started out on their journey or if 
she meant when they "first" observed Burton. It can be presumed she meant when they 
first started out on their trip since there is no evidence she came to a stop for any other 
reason when they saw Burton than the fact that he was an officer requesting such. 
Additionally, there is simply not enough evidence to establish a direct nexus between "at 
first" and when Cook became intoxicated above 0.08%. Had Cook actually helped J .C steer 
on the onset of their journey, the State cannot prove she was intoxicated above 0.08% at 
that point in time, and it only becomes a crime at that level of intoxication. Without the 
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specifics of what J.C. had been referring too, one cannot assume that Cook had exercised 
her dominion and control and was in "actual physical control" of the four-wheeler while also 
being intoxicated above the legal limit. See, Vialpando at ,I 21. 
The State's evidence elicited was "wholly lacking and incapable of creating a reasonable 
inference" as to the exact point in time that J.C. was referring to when mentioning that ''at 
first Cook helped her steer" and to the point in time that Cook became intoxicated while out 
on their little ride. See, Jones at iI 14 citing Vi,gin at ,i 24. Therefore, the evidence with and all 
inferences drawn in the light most favorable to the verdict does not support Cook's 
conviction of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/ or Drugs, a class A 
misdemeanor. See, Ring at iJ2 citing Shumw'!Y at ,r 15. 
J.C. testified that Cook gave her directions by saying "turn this way and all she did was 
hold my shoulders. R136 and R138. Cook providing directions to J.C. did not "amount to 
control over the four-wheeler." See, Benson at 869. J.C. testified that she felt in control of 
the four-wheeler and no evidence was offered to suggest that Cook exhibited "present bodily 
restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation" over J.C. See, Vialpando at iI 21. 
1bis element is intended to be tied to voluntary personal physical action as meant by use of 
the phrase "present bodily restraint", which is modifying to say what type of "direction of 
influence, domination or regulation." Othen'\--rise, an intoxicated person could be held 
responsible for others' voluntary decisions by simply making any suggestions while 
intoxicated. The law does not allow a person to shift blame to another for their personal 
choices unless actions are taken under duress or coercion-similar to the "influence, 
4 
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domination, or regulation" language. There 1s simply no evidence of this from J.C.' s 
testimony regarding Cook. 
J.C. was driving a four-wheeler on a snow packed road, and Cook had the "right to 
provide direction as a duty to warn of any impending danger" of which J.C. could have been 
unaware. See, 'Leuck at 151 Ind.App. 541, 280 N.E.2d at 855 citing Holmes at 120 Ind.App. 
335, 90 N.E.2d at 824. It also would have been appropriate for Cook to provide J.C. with 
vP directions so that she would stay on the road, or directions toward the cabin where they had 
been staying. These directions would not amount to control over the four-wheeler. See, 
Benson. 
In order to have assumed "actual physical control" of the four-wheeler, Cook neede~ to 
have fulfilled two (2) requirements: (1) grabbing the steering wheel; and (2) causing the 
vehicle to move. See, Rivera at 207 Ariz. 74, 83 P.3d 74 citing Atkinson at 331 Md. 199, 627 
.A.2d 1027 and F.H. at 192 Cal.App.4th 1470, 122 Cal.Rtr.3d 46. During trial, when asked if 
he noticed or saw who had been steering the four-wheeler, Burton testified that "Elizabeth 
Cook had her hand on the handlebars when I made initial contact ... " R099. By Burton's 
own words, Cook's hands were just on the handlebars. Burton never testified that he saw 
Cook actually move the handlebars nor turn the handlebars in any direction. In fact, the 
State did not present any further evidence to prove that Cook moved the handlebars or that 
she had "altered the movement" of the four-wheeler even by the "slightest movement" from 
its intended course when initially observed by Burton in order to assume "actual physical 
control." See, Rivera citing Atkinson and F.H. at 192 Ca1App.4th 1470, 122 Cal.Rtt.3d 46. 
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As a passenger on the four-wheeler, Cook would have had to complete each one of the 
two (2) requirements as set forth in Rivera to assume ''actual physical control" for the 
purpose of meeting the elements contained within the DUI statute. See, Rivera citing Atkinson. 
Cook did not maneuver nor change the direction the four-wheeler had been traveling. Cook 
placed her hands in the middle of the handlebars in order to protect J.C. when the four-
wheeler was sliding to a stop on a snow packed road upon observing Burton. Without the 
completion of actually moving the vehicle, Cook could not have been found to be in "actual 
physical control" of the four-wheeler. 
Taken as a whole, the totality of the factual circumstances did not prove Cook 
maneuvered the four-wheeler even the slightest and was in "actual physical control'' See 
F.H. Therefore, Cook thus requests reversal of the Judgment, and remand for resentencing. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FAILING 
TO HAVE DETERMINED THAT A 17 MINUTE CUSlilON 
WAS ENOUGH TO HAVE l\tET BAKER WHEN THE 
SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE TWO DEVICES HAD NOT 
BEEN PROPERLY ESTABLISHED. 
This Court can exclude relevant evidence when "its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice." UT. R. EVID. 403. 
In order for Cook's B.AC results to be admissible, "the State must present evidence, 
inter alia, that: (1) the intoxilyzer machine had been properly checked by a trained technician, 
and that the machine was in proper working condition at the time of the test; (2) the test was 
administered correctly by a qualified operator; and (3) a police officer observed the 
defendant during the fifteen minutes immediately preceding the test to ensure that the 
defendant introduced nothing into his or her mouth during that time." State v. Vialpando, 
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2004 UT App 95, ,I 14, 89 P.3d 209; see In re Oaks, 571 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Utah 
1977) (Maughan, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Baker, 56 Wash.2d 846, 355 P.2d 806, 809-10 
(1960) (articulating foundation elements for intoxilyzer tests)); see also Salt Lake Ciry v. 
Womack, 747 P.2d 1039, 1041 (Utah 1987) (affinning the necessity of the pre-test 
observation period). 
In State v. Baker, the Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc., provided the reasons 
-.J} as to why the 15 (fifteen) minute rule is so important before a BAC is conducted. 
This rule is recognized by Robert L. Donigan, general counsel for the Traffic 
Institute of Northwestern University, in his work entitled 'Chemical Tests and 
the Law,' at page 173, where the author states: 'A breath test will only give an 
accurate measure of the concentration of alcohol in the circulating blood, if 
there has been a lapse of at least 15 minutes between the taking of the last 
drink and the taking of the breath for analysis. During this 15-minute interval, 
any alcoholic liquor remaining in the mouth and throat or under a dental plate 
will have been washed down by saliva. Thereafter, the alcohol concentration 
of the breathed air (alveolar breath) will reflect the alcohol concentration of the 
blood circulating through the lungs.' (First italics ours) 
Ibid. 566 Wash.2d 846, 857, 355 P.2d 806, 812 (1960). The Baker court went on to further 
state that "the [S]tate is bound by its own evidence to the effect that the minimum period of 
delay must be fifteen minutes." Id. 
In the instant matter, Cook does not contest that the State presented sufficient 
evidence to meet the first two (2) requirements under Baker, however, Cook's argues the fact 
the a "seventeen (17) minute cushion" is not sufficient to meet the last and most crucial 
element of Baker when no evidence was provided as to the synchronization of the two (2) 
timing devices in order for the BAC to be admissible evidence. 
Burton first testified at trial that he "probably used his cell phone" to note the time of 
Baker. Rt 10. After further questioning, Burton testified that he did not use his cell phone to 
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time the Baker fifteen (15) minute requirement period. Rl 15. Based upon Burton's 
testimony, two (2) timing devices were used to administer Baker on Cook; however, the State 
did not present evidence as to the exact timing devices that were used and if the times were 
at all synchronized. Baker was observed on Cook at 14:34 and Burton administered her BAC 
at 14:15. R109-10. The trial court admitted Cook's BAC because they found that a two (2) 
minute cushion of seventeen (17) minutes met the fifteen (15) minute observation 
requirement period of Baker. See, Vialpando at ,I 14, citing Oaks at 1367, Baker at 809-10 and 
Salt Lake City at 1041. Without synchronization, the court's finding of a two (2) minute 
cushion is '\vithout sufficient evidentiary support since only the synchronization could 
indicate whether any cushion existed at all. 
The trial's court finding of a two (2) minute ''cushion" was clearly erroneous because 
Burton could not adequately pin-point what two (2) timing devices he used to time Baker. 
The State cannot prove all elements of Baker occurred without the identification of the two 
timing devices, the two devices available for inspection by defense, and a record made by 
Burton as to the synchronization. If one of the devices was off by a few minutes from the 
other de·vice, the fifteen (15) minute time period was not fully observed and Baker was not 
fulfilled. The State was bound by their own evidence to prove all elements of Baker in order 
for Cook's BAC to be admissible. See, Baker at 566 Wash.2d 857, 355 P.2d at 812. The 
State's evidence is lacking foundational support for the lawful admittance of Cook's BAC. 
Without the identification of what two (2) timing devices were used, the State cannot 
prove that the "minimum period of delay was actually fifteen (15) minutes," in order for 
Cook's B..AC to give an "accurate measure of the concentration of alcohol circulating in her 
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blood stream." See, Id. Therefore, the admittance of Cook's BAC was unfairly prejudicial 
and should not have been found to be admissible. See, UT. R. EVID. 403. Cook requests a 
remand for resentencing with specific instructions that her BAC be excluded as evidence. 
III. BURNS WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING PROTECT 
COOK'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT'S AND FOLLOW-
THROUGH WITH A "CRITICAL" SUPPRESSION 
HEARING. 
The Fifth and Fourteen .Amendments to the United States Constitution provide that 
the accused shall not be deprived of life, liberty or property without Due Process. The Sixth 
Amendment provides the accused with the right to counsel. 
In State v. Cuny, the Utah Court of Appeals stated that "[u]nder both the United 
States Constitution and the Utah Constitution, [Defendant] had the right to the assistance of 
counsel at all critical stages of his criminal proceeding." Ibid, 2006 UT App 390, ,I 6, 147 
P.3d 483, dting Wagstciff v. Barnes, 802 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah App.1990); see also U.S. CONST . 
.AMEND VI; UTAH CONST. ART. I,§ 12. <The accused's right to the assistance of counsel 
during the critical stages of a criminal proceeding has long been recognized as a fundamental 
constitutional right." Id. at 776-77. 
Bums' filed the Motion requesting the suppression of Cook's BAC test results; 
however, he failed to follow-through and have a suppression hearing heard on the Motion. 
R060 and Rl 13. Bums was not entitled to waive Cook's constitutional rights in favor of trial 
strategy, specifically when he stated that he would have addressed Bak.er issues during a 
suppression hearing. Cook's Due Process rights were violated when Bums failed to follow 
through with the Motion. See, U.S. CONST . .AMEND. V. and U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV. 
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Whether or not the evidence against Cook was detennined to be overwhehning does 
not matter. Cook's guilt or innocence was not a factor in order for a suppression hearing to 
be held. A suppression hearing was a necessity to the outcome of Cook's case. Cook was 
entitled to a suppression hearing because her BAC was unconstitutionally obtained during a 
Baker violation that occutted when the fifteen (15) minute observation period was not 
actually observed. Cook was entitled to ''effective assistance of counsel" throughout the 
duration of her criminal case. See, U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI and CIIT1_J citing Wagstaff at 778. 
The suppression hearing was "critical" to Cook and a hearing that she was entitled too. See, 
Cuny ,I 6 citing Wagstaff at 778. Thus, Cook requests this Court remand her case for 
resentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Cook respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the Judgment, Sentence and Commitment and remand with appropriate instructions for re-
sentencing in this matter. 
DAlED this 20th day of June, 2016. 
Attorney far Elizabeth Victoria Coo 
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RULE 24(0(1)(C) CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
Counsel herein certifies that this Repfy Brief of Appellant is in compliance with the type-
volwne limitations contained in UT. R. APP. P. 24(f)(1)(A) in that it contains 3023 words, as 
was detennined by the word processing system used to prepare Repfy Brief of Appellant. 
DA1ED this 20th day of June 2016. 
CARLING LAW OFFICE, PC 
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Attorn'!Y for Elizabeth Victoria Cook 
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Iron Count Attorney's Office 
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